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Introduction
Numerous attempts have been made to conceive and implement 
appropriate information systems to support architectural design-
ers in their creative design thinking processes. These information 
systems aim at providing support in varying ways: enabling 
designers to make diverse kinds of visual representations of a 
design, enabling them to make complex calculations and simula-
tions that take into account various relevant parameters in the 
design context, providing them with relevant information and 
knowledge from all over the world, and so forth. Despite the con-
tinuing efforts to develop these information systems, they still fail 
at this point to provide essential support in the core creative activi-
ties of architectural designers. Seeking to understand why an 
appropriately effective support from information systems is so 
hard to realize, we began to look into the nature of design thinking 
and on how reasoning processes are at play in this design think-
ing. Our investigation suggests that creative designing rests on a 
cyclic combination of abductive, deductive, and inductive reason-
ing processes. However, traditional information systems typically 
target only one of these reasoning processes at a time, which might 
explain their limited applicability and usefulness. As research in 
information technology increasingly targets the combination of 
these reasoning modes, improvements in design thinking support 
by information systems might be within reach.
Information System Support for Design
Understanding how an information system can provide support 
in the design process requires sufficient understanding of how 
design thinking occurs in this process. Constructing such an 
understanding has been the goal of many research initiatives dur-
ing previous decades. Several appropriate overviews are available 
that describe the historical evolutions in these research initiatives 
and their outcomes.1 We elaborate here on some of the key points 
in this domain of research, focusing on the theories outlined by 
Nigel Cross, Bryan Lawson, Donald Schön, and Herbert Simon. 
Central elements in these theories are (1) the intensive interaction 
1 See Nigan Bayazit, “Investigating Design: 
A Review of Forty Years of Design 
Research,” Design Issues  20, no. 1 
(2004): 16-29; Nigel Cross, “Forty Years 
of Design Research,” Design Research 
Quarterly 1, no. 2 (2007): 3-5.
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between designer and design context, and (2) the reflective, “learn-
ing-while-doing” character of the design thinking process. In 
learning-while-doing, designers build up knowledge in direct 
reference to concrete experiences. This knowledge is often referred 
to as “a designerly way of knowing.”2 Designers make design deci-
sions in newly encountered design contexts on the basis of this 
kind of knowledge. Through their ongoing interaction with new 
design contexts, designers continuously modify or adjust their 
designerly way of knowing. These adjustments obviously have a 
significant effect on future design decisions.
 Over the years, the design research community has recog-
nized how reasoning based on a set of previous experiences is 
crucial for creative thinking and for mental activity in general. 
Several theories refer to this kind of reasoning as “abductive 
reasoning.”3 These and comparable theories typically refer to the 
work of Charles Sanders Peirce, and more specifically to his work 
that combines abductive reasoning with deductive and inductive 
reasoning. Peirce argues that the combination of these three rea-
soning modes underlies any process of scientific inquiry.4 Many 
researchers have tried to simulate these reasoning modes in a 
computer environment. Whether or not these attempts were suc-
cessful, or could possibly and eventually be successful, is not of 
central concern for this article. Instead, we hope to evaluate to 
what extent and in which way(s) information systems might sup-
port these reasoning modes of the designer.
 A digital repository of architectural information can be con-
sidered an example of a support system because it makes a limited 
version of other people’s architectural experiences available to 
any reasoning process all over the world. One such repository is 
that which resulted from the initiative Metadata for Architectural 
Contents in Europe (MACE). This repository relies on metadata to 
interconnect and disseminate digital information about architec-
ture.5 However, examples of how such repositories are usefully 
deployed i n  ex i s t i ng  a rc h itec t u ra l  de s ig n prac t ic e s 
are lacking, which might indicate that they are not fully suited to 
support the reasoning processes of a designer. Similar limitations 
exist for other types of support by information systems, essentially 
indicating a mismatch between design thinking and the support 
provided by information systems.
 To understand the basic causes of such an apparent mis-
match, we compare in this article how design thinking appears to 
occur in the human mind and how information systems aim to 
provide support to an architectural designer. We first give a brief 
overview of the most significant theories in design thinking. 
Second, we discuss natural human reasoning processes and how 
they relate to theories of design thinking. Third, we outline the 
supposed mismatch between the theories of design thinking and 
2 See Nigel Cross, “Styles of Learning, 
Designing and Computing,” Design 
Studies 6, no. 3 (1985): 157-62; Nigel 
Cross, Designerly Ways of Knowing 
(London: Springer-Verlag, 2006), 5-9.
3 See Nigel Cross, “The Nature and 
Nurture of Design Ability,” Design 
Studies 11, no. 3 (1990): 132.
4 Charles S. Peirce, Collected Papers of 
Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. 1-6, ed. C. 
Hartshorne and P. Weiss (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1931-1935), 
vols. 7-8, ed. A.W. Burks (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1958).
5 Moritz Stefaner et al., “MACE – Enriching 
Architectural Learning Objects for 
Experience Multiplication,” in Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science 4753: Second 
European Conference on Technology 
Enhanced Learning, ed. Erik Duval, Ralf 
Klamma, and Martin Wolpers (Berlin: 
Springer-Verlag, 2007), 322-36.
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6 Cross, Designerly Ways of Knowing.
7 Nigel Cross, “Designerly Ways of 
Knowing,” Design Studies  3, no. 4  
(1982): 221-27.
8 Mary Douglas and Baron Isherwood,  
The World of Goods: Towards an 
Anthropology of Consumption  (New 
York: Basic Books, 1979), viii.
9 See Cross, The Nature and Nurture of 
Design Ability, 132; Peirce, Collected 
Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce; Lionel 
March, “The Logic of Design and the 
Question of Value,” in The Architecture  
of Form, ed. Lionel March (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976), 1-40; 
Joseph E. Bogen, “The Other Side of the 
Brain II: an Appositional Mind,” Bull Los 
Angeles Neurological Societies 34 no. 3 
(1969): 135-62.
10 Keith J. Holyoak, Dedre Gentner, and 
Boicho N. Kokinov, “Introduction: The 
Place of Analogy in Cognition,” in The 
Analogical Mind: Perspectives from 
Cognitive Science, ed. Dedre Gentner, 
Keith J. Holyoak, and Boicho K. Kokinov 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 1-19.
11 Dedre Gentner et al., “Metaphor Is Like 
Analogy,” in The Analogical Mind, 200. 
information system support, thereby considering three application 
development approaches. Based on this analysis, we offer sugges-
tions for addressing the mismatch.
Theories of Design Thinking
A lot of theories of design thinking exist. We focus in this section 
on (elements of) these theories that are related to the actual reason-
ing processes of the designer, and to design representations and 
guiding principles in design.
Reasoning in Design
Several researchers have made a case to identify design as a sepa-
rate discipline in human thinking, apart from the disciplines of the 
arts and the sciences. With his theory of “a designerly way of 
knowing,” Nigel Cross can be counted among these researchers.6 
His theory essentially distinguishes design knowledge from 
the kinds of knowledge typically at play in the disciplines of 
the arts and the sciences.7 Throughout his publications, Cross 
strongly associates this kind of knowledge with the specific nature 
of design thinking. His reference to the research of Douglas and 
Isherwood illustrates his understanding of this kind of thinking: 
 For too long a narrow idea of human reasoning has  
 prevailed which only accepts simple induction and  
 deduction as worthy of the name of thinking. But there  
 is a prior and pervasive kind of reasoning that scans a   
 scene and sizes it up, packing into one instant’s survey  
 a process of matching, classifying and comparing. [...]  
 Metaphoric appreciation, as all the words we have  
 used suggest, is a work of approximate measurement,  
 scaling, and comparison between like and unlike  
 elements in a pattern.8
Later on, Cross refers to several other research initiatives that 
distinguish a very similar kind of reasoning as fundamental 
for design thinking; here, he mentions the terms abductive reason- 
ing, productive reasoning, and appositional reasoning, which are 
the terms assigned by their respective originators, Peirce, March, 
and Bogen.9
 The “work of approximate measurement” or “metaphoric 
appreciation” is closely related to analogical reasoning and the 
reasoning involved in pattern recognition. Analogical reasoning 
is often explained as the cognitive ability to think about rela- 
tional patterns.10 It allows one to find a structural alignment or 
mapping between a base and a target pattern residing in (par- 
tially) different domains.11 By making such an analogical mapping, 
familiar knowledge about the base pattern can be related to the 
target pattern, thereby filling in the gaps of the target pattern and 
creating new knowledge. In a context of architectural design, 
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analogical reasoning often occurs between a new design-related 
experience (e.g., a building, sketch, 3D model, conversation, etc.) 
and a previous design experience. But also in the very act of 
sketching, analogical reasoning is critical because it allows reinter-
preting or “seeing as,” as Goldschmidt puts it.12 In “seeing as,” the 
designer reinterprets the sketch and adds new and unique mean-
ing to it, thereby generating new ideas.
 Another argument for the recognition of design as a sepa-
rate discipline, apart from the disciplines of the arts and the sci-
ences, is formulated by Bryan Lawson in his theory of “how 
designers think.”13 An important basis for his argument stems 
from his experimental observations in which he saw differences 
between the thinking processes of architects (closer to “imagin-
ing”) and of engineers (closer to “reasoning”).14 Reasoning in this 
case is considered more purposive and directed toward a particu-
lar conclusion, whereas imagining is said to draw from an indi-
vidual’s own experiences, combining material in a relatively 
unstructured and perhaps aimless way. Note that Lawson does not 
exclude the coexistence of imagining and reasoning in one mind. 
Instead, he considers the control of the delicate balance between 
rational and imaginative thought as one of the most important 
skills of a designer.15 Note also that this definition of imagining 
is again closely tied to analogical reasoning. Because analogical 
reasoning is guided by encountered target patterns, which are 
out of the designer’s grasp, the designer appears to proceed “in 
an unstructured and perhaps aimless way.” A similar characteriza-
tion is given by Boden’s research on “the creative mind.”16 She 
stresses the importance of the incubation phase in creative think-
ing. In this phase, the conscious mind focuses on other domains, 
problems, or projects, thus enabling the creative mind to make 
diverse analogies with the (design) situation at hand.
 A second characteristic of reasoning in design is given 
by Donald Schön. He characterizes design thinking as a sense-
making process, in which the designer “must make sense of an 
uncertain situation that initially makes no sense.”17 This type of 
reasoning process can be distinguished from more “traditional” 
reasoning processes, in which problems are typically represented 
as well-confined and fixed givens, and one merely has to select 
the most appropriate method available to get to a solution. This 
distinction is also made by other researchers in design thinking 
by stating that designers do not follow a straight-forward path 
from problem to solution, but instead oscillate between problem(s) 
and solution(s). For instance, Cross indicates that designing 
does not proceed in a sequence of stages that targets each one of 
the (partial) problems initially identified or outlined. Instead, 
designing appears to proceed through an iterative form of inter-
play between partial problems and their solutions. “During the 
design process, partial models of the problem and of its solution 
12 Gabriela Goldschmidt, “The Dialectics of 
Sketching,” Creativity Research Journal  
4, no. 2 (1991): 131-32.
13 Bryan Lawson, How Designers Think - 
The Design Process Demystified   
(Oxford: Architectural Press, 2005).
14 Bryan Lawson, “Cognitive Strategies in 
Architectural Design,” Ergonomics 22,  
no. 1 (1979): 59-68.
15 Lawson, How Designers Think, 138.
16 Margaret A. Boden, The Creative Mind: 
Myths and Mechanisms (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990), 29-36.
17 Donald Schön, The Reflective 
Practitioner: How Professionals Think in 
Action (London: Temple Smith, 1983), 40.
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are constructed side-by-side, as it were. The crucial factor, how-
ever, is the bridging of these two partial models by the articulation 
of an apposite concept [...] which enables the models to be mapped 
onto each other.”18 Dorst and Cross link the interplay between 
partial problems and solutions to the notion of “co-evolution” of 
problem and solution.19 This notion of co-evolution was suggested 
previously by Maher and Poon.20 According to the concept of co-
evolution, both problem and solution evolve during a combined 
process of exploration as depicted in Maher and Poon’s “Problem-
Design Exploration Model” (see Figure 1).21
 Finally, a similar approach is also put forward by Herbert 
Simon in his “sciences of the artificial.”22 In his discussion of 
the problem-solving process preceding any artifact, Simon dissoci-
ates himself from the traditional, rational viewpoint, in which 
the outer environment would be modeled as a combination of, 
for example, cost and revenue curves, so that one can “easily” 
calculate the optimum through a process of “substantive rational-
ity.”23 In reality, the problem is far more complex, says Simon, 
because one is required to cope with numerous elements of un-
certainty and with quality (vs. quantity) criteria. Thus, “at each 
step toward realism, the problem gradually changes from choosing 
the right course of action (substantive rationality) to finding a 
way of calculating, very approximately, where a good course of 
action lies (procedural rationality).”24 As a result, Simon eventually 
concludes that a designer is essentially a “satisficer”—a person 
who aims at a good enough alternative, starting from a set of 
combinations of possible problem descriptions and correspond- 
ing solutions.
Design Representations and Guiding Principles
Two elements are crucial in the sense-making process of designers: 
(1) what designers experience at design time (task environment/
target patterns) and (2) what designers have already experienced 
before (background knowledge/base patterns). Both elements are 
also considered central in the notion of a “design problem space,” 
18 Nigel Cross, “Descriptive Models of 
Creative Design: Application to an 
Example,” Design Studies 18, no. 4 
(1997): 439.
19 Kees Dorst and Nigel Cross, “Creativity in 
the Design Process: Co-evolution of 
Problem-Solution,” Design Studies 22, 
no. 5 (2001): 425-37.
20 Mary L. Maher and Josiah Poon, 
“Modeling Design Exploration as 
Co-evolution,” Microcomputers in Civil 
Engineering 11, no. 3 (1996): 195-209.
21 Josiah Poon and Mary L. Maher, 
“Co-evolution in Design: A Case Study of 
the Sydney Opera House,” in Proceedings 
of the Second Conference on Computer 
Aided Architectural Design Research in 
Asia, ed. Yu-Tung Liu, Jin-Yeu Tsou and 
June-Hao Hou (Taipei: Hu’s publisher, 
1997), 441.
22 Herbert A. Simon, The Sciences of the 
Artificial  (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
23 Ibid., 25-30.
24 Ibid., 27.
Figure 1 
Maher and Poon’s “Problem-Design 
Exploration Model” (courtesy of Mary L. 
Maher and Josiah Poon).
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as defined by Goel and Pirolli: “a formalization of the structure of 
processing molded by the characteristics of the information-pro-
cessing system [the designer’s knowledge], and more importantly, 
the task environment [the designer’s experiences].”25 By endlessly 
combining both elements, designers continuously form renewed 
understandings of their design (target pattern) and of their back-
ground knowledge (base pattern).
 Sketches are among the most obvious examples of experiences 
that designers go through at design time.26 As Goldschmidt indi-
cates, sketches are not only visual expressions of what one wants to 
express; they also are elements for reinterpretation and thus for 
generating all kinds of new knowledge.27 Cross similarly refers to 
the importance of sketching because it enables a designer to explore 
several solutions and problems to a certain design situation at 
once, thereby considering several levels of detail at once.28 Schön, in 
turn, refers to the habit of many a designer to continuously make 
representations of the design situation at hand in documents, plans, 
and sketches, thereby allowing a designer both to answer a previ-
ously generated problem situation or design situation, and to frame 
the design situation anew into an alternative perspective. 
 A valuable theory of the role of background knowledge of a 
designer is formed by Lawson’s theory of so-called “guiding prin-
ciples” or “design philosophies.”29 These concepts can be under-
stood as the background knowledge or the knowledge by 
experience of a designer—the set of familiar design patterns that 
the designer might use in making analogies with new design expe-
riences. According to Lawson, these guiding principles include not 
just objective, factual information but also information involving, 
for instance, motivations, beliefs, values, and attitudes. Guiding 
principles may be very intense and clearly structured, and they 
might be vague and unclear, but they always influence design 
decisions one way or another. In some research initiatives, they are 
almost considered part of a “personal religion,” thereby implicitly 
redefining design as “a very complicated act of faith.”30 With some-
times profound intensity, designers hold to these personal guiding 
principles, believing it “morally right” to follow them.
A Reasoning- and Principal-Based Design Process 
From the investigation of existing theories, we can construct a 
possible outline of the design process. As displayed in the outline 
in Figure 2, the design process proceeds by making analogies 
between encountered situations in the physical world and guiding 
principles in the human mind. The resulting analogies can be con-
sidered the designer’s interpretations of encountered situations. By 
making an analogy, the designer generates hypotheses and pre-
dicts that the rest of the familiar pattern also applies to the 
encountered situation. In other words, new knowledge is created 
25 Vinod Goel and Peter Pirolli, “The 
Structure of Design Problem Spaces,” 
Cognitive Science 16, no. 3 (1992): 399.
26 A.Terry Purcell and John S. Gero, 
“Drawings and the Design Process: A 
Review of Protocol Studies in Design and 
Other Disciplines and Related Research 
in Cognitive Psychology,” Design Studies 
19, no. 4 (1998): 389-430.
27 Goldschmidt, “The Dialectics of 
Sketching,” 123-43.
28 Nigel Cross, “Natural Intelligence in 
Design,” Design Studies 20, no. 1 (1999): 
25-39.
29 Lawson, How Designers Think, 159-80.
30 John C. Jones, “Design Methods 
Reviewed,” in The Design Method, ed. 
Sidney A. Gregory (London: Butterworth, 
1966), 295-310.
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by the analogy. The designer finally tests the prediction made, 
thereby creating a new situation or experience that either confirms 
or refutes the original analogy. When refuted, an alternative anal-
ogy is sought. When confirmed, the pattern is added to the back-
ground knowledge, thereby indirectly changing the guiding 
principles of the designer. This process continuously starts anew: 
“[The designers] shape the situation, in accordance with [their] ini-
tial appreciation of it, the situation ‘talks back,’ and [they] respond 
to the situation’s back-talk.”31
A Reasonable Explanation of Human Design Thinking
Several parallels can be made between the schema in Figure 2 and 
theories of human reasoning processes in general. Earlier work by 
Purcell and Gero draws similar parallels with cognitive psychol-
ogy, in which they aim at learning and refining theories in design 
thinking with concepts from cognitive psychology and vice 
versa.32 We mark out four main elements that can serve as a basis 
for documenting such parallels. Based on these parallels, we try to 
find a reasonable explanation of processes underlying human 
design thinking:
 1. The importance of analogical or abductive reasoning in  
  producing creative ideas, 
 2. The concept of co-evolution of problems and solutions, 
 3. The physical world with which the designer interacts  
  (experiences), and
 4. Guiding principles or background theories built up  
  by experiences. 
Rational Problem Solving
Many theoretical views exist on the reasoning mechanisms 
underlying natural human thinking. Several of these views origi-
nate from research on discovery and explanation in science. 
31 Donald Schön, The Reflective 
Practitioner, 79.
32 Purcell and Gero, “Drawings and the 
Design Process,” 389-430.
33 See Atocha Aliseda, Abductive 
Reasoning: Logical Investigations into 
Discovery and Explanation  (Dordrecht, 
The Netherlands: Springer-Verlag, 2006), 
xii; Atocha Aliseda, “Logics in Scientific 
Discovery,” Foundations of Science 9,  
no. 3 (2004): 339-63.
Figure 2 
Possible Outline of the Design Process.
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Aliseda indicates how “traditional” views on this topic mainly 
focus on a “context of justification” and maintain that topics like 
creativity, idea generation, and hypothesizing belong to a separate 
“context of discovery,” which is considered outside the realm of 
philosophical reflection and cannot be subject to any formal treat-
ment.33 From this point of view, explanations are “logical substi-
tutes rather than real processes” or “rational reconstructions,” or 
they are “thinking processes in a way in which they ought to occur 
if they are to be ranged in a consistent system.”34 This approach 
forms the basis for the early work on problem solving in the 1960s. 
When following this approach, researchers focus mainly on the 
context of justification, thereby limiting their investigations to the 
“rational reconstructions” in problem solving (i.e., well-structured 
problems).35 Such well-structured problems can supposedly be 
solved by selecting the appropriate heuristic methods.
 By focusing solely on the context of justification, the first 
step in the problem-solving process is largely excluded. In this 
step, problem solvers convert a real-world problem into a well-
structured problem, or, in other words, they construct a “problem 
space” through a process of problem structuring. In the context 
of design (see Figure 3), this step is the one in which designers 
creatively interpret physical experiences using their background 
knowledge or guiding principles. In the traditional problem- 
solving approach, the element of creativity thus remains left out, 
resulting only in methods for solving artificial, well-structured 
problems. In terms of the four main elements outlined previously, 
this rational problem solving approach considers only the element 
of co-evolution (2). Analogical reasoning for producing creative 
ideas (1), the physical world or task environment (3), and the guid-
ing principles (4) are largely left out.
DesignerPhysical world
sketch
physical model
...
=
analogy
guiding principles
prediction
experience
problem structuring
interpretation
action
rational problem 
solving
problem
solution
Figure 3 
The Context of Discovery and the Context  
of Justification in Design Thinking.
34 Hans Reichenbach, Experience and 
Prediction: An Analysis of the 
Foundations and the Structure of 
Knowledge (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1938), 5.
35 See Allen Newell, Cliff Shaw, and 
Herbert A. Simon, “The Processes of 
Creative Thinking,” in Contemporary 
Approaches to Creative Thinking,  
ed. Howard E. Gruber, Glenn Terrell,  
and Michael Wertheimer (New York:  
Atherton Press, 1963), 63-119; Allen 
Newell and Herbert A. Simon, Human 
Problem Solving (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice Hall, 1972).
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Peirce’s Process of Scientific Inquiry
More recent theoretical views on human thinking try to recombine 
both contexts (i.e., discovery and justification) again into one “pro-
cess of inquiry” and try to reassess to what extent the diverse 
aspects or stages in this process can be subject to a formal treat-
ment.36 Charles Sanders Peirce, whose work informs most of these 
theories, was one of the first to reconsider the process of coming to 
discoveries and producing justifications as one “process of (scien-
tific) inquiry.” Peirce’s theories of reasoning and human thinking 
change a lot during his research, which is reflected throughout the 
eight volumes of Peirce’s papers collected from 1931 (vol. 1-6) to 
1958 (vol. 7 and 8).37 That Peirce differentiates between three types 
of reasoning—namely, deductive, inductive, and abductive reason-
ing—is now more or less accepted. According to Peirce, reasoning 
should not be limited solely to a “correct” or “rational” kind of rea-
soning (i.e., deduction and induction), but instead should reflect a 
combination of all possible thought processes of the human 
mind (which includes abduction). In comparison with traditional 
viewpoints, Peirce thus suggests the addition of this third kind 
of reasoning, abductive, which encompasses our ability to generate 
hypotheses about the world and to choose one of them as a possi-
ble explanation. 
 The three reasoning modes are typically explained in the 
context of scientific inquiry. A good review of Peirce’s understand-
ing of this process of scientific inquiry is given by Flach and Kakas: 
 When confronted with a number of observations [they]   
 seek to explain, the scientists come up with an initial   
 hypothesis; then [they] investigate what other conse-  
 quences this theory, were it true, would have; and finally  
 [they] evaluate the extent to which these predicted  
 consequences agree with reality. Peirce calls the first  
 stage, coming up with a hypothesis to explain the initial  
 observations, abduction; predictions are derived from a  
 suggested hypothesis by deduction; and the credibility  
 of that hypothesis is estimated through its predictions  
 by induction.38 
This description illustrates how the three reasoning modes should 
be understood as parts of one whole—parts that continuously flow 
into each other and that underlie human thought, including prob-
lem solving and design. In this understanding, Peirce’s theory of 
human thinking is in accordance with our schema of the design 
thinking process (see Figure 4), including each of the four elements 
previously outlined.
36 See Hans R. Fischer, “Abductive 
Reasoning as a Way of Worldmaking,” 
Foundations of Science 6, no.4 (2001): 
361-83; Oliver Ray, “Automated 
Abduction in Scientific Discovery,” in 
Model-Based Reasoning in Science, 
Technology and Medicine, ed. Lorenzo 
Magnani (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2007), 
103-16; Atocha Aliseda, Abductive 
Reasoning: Logical Investigations into 
Discovery and Explanation; and Atocha 
Aliseda, “Logics in Scientific Discovery,” 
339-63.
37 Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles 
Sanders Peirce.
38 Peter A. Flach and Antonis C. Kakas, 
“Abductive and Inductive Reasoning: 
Background and Issues,” in Abduction 
and Induction: Essays on their Relation 
and Integration, ed. Peter A. Flach and 
Antonis C. Kakas (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Press, 2000), 6.
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39. Ibid., 12.
40. See Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles 
Sanders Peirce, 5.181; Aliseda, Abductive 
Reasoning: Logical Investigations into 
Discovery and Explanation, 171; Flach 
and Kakas, “Abductive and Inductive 
Reasoning: Background and Issues,” 7.
Figure 4
The Intertwining of Abductive, Deductive,  
and Inductive Reasoning in the Context of 
Design Thinking.
DesignerPhysical world
sketch
physical model
...
=
analogy
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prediction
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action
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GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES
abduction
induction
deduction
Abduction, Deduction, and Induction
Peirce’s understanding of each of the three reasoning modes dif-
fers substantially from the “traditional” understanding that 
focuses solely on the context of justification. We give a brief sum-
mary of Peirce’s discourse on these three reasoning modes in the 
following paragraphs.
 Abduction is described by Peirce as the process of generating 
and choosing hypotheses in the process of inquiry: “From a collec-
tion of observations which are judged according to some back-
ground information to be similar or related, we draw hypotheses 
that generalize this observed behavior to other as yet unseen 
cases.”39 This process is most often explained using a visual obser-
vation example, in which a person makes hypotheses or tries to 
explain a visual observation. It is very often also associated with 
the “flash of insight” or the “eureka-moment” in a discovery.40 The 
important caveat to keep in mind is that inferences resulting from 
abductive reasoning are hypotheses and not absolute truths, and 
they can be refuted through a series of contradicting observations.
Deduction plays an important role in the overall reasoning process. 
Considered separately, however, its breadth of influence appears 
limited in Peirce’s understanding because he points out that all 
deductive conclusions are determined by the premises. In the 
context of Peirce’s process of scientific inquiry, these premises are 
the background knowledge of the reasoning instance and the 
hypothesis obtained through abduction. In the terms displayed in 
Figure 4, a set of guiding principles and a hypothesis determine 
the prediction, but one still has to provide these premises. This 
part of the process can be recognized in the creation and usage of 
more traditional computer applications. Most of the application 
logic is written beforehand in a complex combination of objects, 
classes, and relations. Based on some user input, the application 
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generates a certain result. The quality of this result directly 
depends on the quality of the premises—in this case, the applica-
tion logic and the user input. The most challenging part in produc-
ing and using such applications thus lies in creating a sufficiently 
intricate network of premises, and not in the deduction itself.
 Induction, finally, has several definitions but is most often 
identified with “enumerative induction:” making generalizations 
from a set of similar observations.41 In this case, induction sup- 
posedly starts from a series of recurring observations, in which 
one sees a pattern and subsequently learns the rule behind this 
pattern. This understanding naturally includes a probabilistic 
or statistical flavor. Peirce, however, upholds a different defini- 
tion following directly from his discussion of the process of 
inquiry (refer again to Figure 4). In his understanding, induction 
is identified with “a course of experimental investigation.” This 
“experimental investigation” should be understood in a broad 
sense—namely, any “question put to nature.” For instance, such 
questions include scientific experiments, design tryouts, medical 
diagnoses, talking and listening, etc. Note that in this under- 
standing, abductive reasoning is the only ampliative reasoning 
type because it offers the only moment where new, original 
hypotheses or “suppositions” are put forward. Induction according 
to Peirce’s definition does not generate new knowledge; it only 
confirms or refutes hypotheses that were produced previously 
through abduction: “Like any interrogatory, it is based on a suppo-
sition. If that supposition be correct, a certain sensible result is 
to be expected under certain circumstances which can be created, 
or at any rate with which are to be met. The question is, “will this 
be the result?”42
 We want to stress that Peirce’s theory is not confined to sci-
entific reasoning but can be used in several application domains, 
including common-sense reasoning, idea generation, architectural 
design, health care, and more. A recent overview of how abductive, 
deductive, and inductive reasoning processes are at play in design 
thinking, including several real world examples, can be found 
in the works of both Edwin Gardner and Jon Kolko.43
Criticism against Peirce’s Theory
Peirce’s theory is not the only existing theory explaining human 
reasoning. In fact, notable criticism exists that argues against this 
theory. This criticism focuses mainly on the abductive reason- 
ing mode. The main argument against Peirce’s theory is the one 
given by Frankfurt, who argues that Peirce’s definition of abduc-
tion is paradoxical because it is proclaimed as the sole ampliative 
reasoning mode, yet it typically contains its conclusion(s) already 
in its premises.44 Frankfurt hereby refers to the logical form of an 
abductive inference, which indeed contains its conclusion already 
in its premises. 
41 Ehud Y. Shapiro, “Inductive Inference of 
Theories from Facts,” in Computational 
Logic: Essays in Honor of Alan Robinson, 
ed. Jean-Louis Lassez and Gordon Plotkin 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 199-254.
42 Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles 
Sanders Peirce, 5, 168.
43 See Edwin Gardner, “Reasoning in 
Architecture: About the Diagrammatic 
Nature of Thinking with Real and 
Imagined Objects” (Master’s thesis,  
Delft University of Technology, 2009);  
Jon Kolko, “Abductive Thinking and 
Sensemaking: The Drivers of Design 
Synthesis,” Design Issues 26, no. 1 
(2010): 15-28.
44 Harry G. Frankfurt, “Peirce’s Notion of 
Abduction,” The Journal of Philosophy 
55, no. 14 (1958): 594.
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 The surprising fact, C, is observed;
 But if A were true, C would be a matter of course. 
 Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.45
If we compare this argument with Goldschmidt’s terms of “seeing 
that” and “seeing as,” this argument would state that “seeing as” 
does not generate any new ideas because both the sketches and the 
human mind already had all the components necessary to produce 
the new ideas. An in-depth discussion of this argument is impor-
tant but is beyond the scope of this article. In our opinion, novelty 
is generated by the unique combination of an external element in 
the physical world and a specific body of knowledge. Because this 
combination appears to be one of the main arguments of Peirce’s 
process of inquiry, we consider this process of considerable value 
for the domain of architectural design thinking.
Analysis of Information System Support for Design Thinking
In this part of the article, we analyze how information technology 
currently provides support for design thinking, based on the theo-
retical overview provided. We try to indicate the main causes of 
the apparent mismatch between information system support and 
design thinking processes, so that we might be able to address it 
more appropriately. In this analysis, we distinguish between three 
application development approaches: (1) applications as surrogates 
for reasoning modes, (2) applications as tools for experimenting, 
and (3) applications as autonomous reasoning agents.
Surrogates of Reasoning Modes
Applications that might be understood as surrogates for the abduc-
tive reasoning mode in architectural design thinking are applica-
tions that supposedly create useful analogies between descriptions 
of a given situation and situations in memory. This process is the 
main driver behind the retrieval phase of case-based reasoning 
(CBR) applications.46 In CBR applications, new “cases” are com-
pared with a large collection of “known cases” to find a solution to 
a problem by analogy. The MACE metadata archive could be 
considered a recent application with a similar objective—a case 
base described by metadata.47 By specifying queries in the search 
or browse window, users present new cases to the system, which 
are then used to retrieve the most appropriate analogies from the 
cases in the case base. 
 This approach is indeed very similar to the experience-
based nature of architectural design thinking. The main issue in 
realizing such an experience-based retrieval system is the struc-
ture used to describe the cases or experiences. As we indicated 
earlier, architectural knowledge is formed through personal expe-
riences and is of a highly dynamic nature. Designing and imple-
menting a structure to describe this kind of knowledge is difficult, 
45 Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles 
Sanders Peirce, 5, 189.
46 Agnar Aamodt and Enric Plaza, “Case-
Based Reasoning: Foundational Issues, 
Methodological Variations, and System 
Approaches,” AI Communications 7,  
no. 1 (1994): 39-59.
47 Stefaner et al., “MACE – Enriching 
Architectural Learning Objects for 
Experience Multiplication,” 322-36.
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48 See Herbert A. Simon, “The Structure  
of Ill-Structured Problems,” Artificial 
Intelligence 4, no. 3 (1973): 181-201;  
and Vinod Goel, “A Comparison of  
Well-Structured and Ill-Structured Task 
Environments and Problem Spaces,” in 
Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual 
Conference of the Cognitive Science 
Society (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, 1992), 844-49.
49 Purcell and Gero, “Drawings and the 
Design Process,” 389-430.
or even nearly impossible, because of the ill-structured nature of 
architectural “problem” situations.48 The situation is shaped by so 
many parameters that one single best solution does not exist; 
instead, many different re-solutions are available, depending on 
the parameters to which one attends. When molding an architec-
tural “case” into an information structure, one similarly chooses 
certain parameters as characteristic of the case—called “features” 
in the context of CBR—thereby losing characteristics that might 
be crucial when retrieving cases in other contexts.
 Applications that might be understood as surrogates for 
the deductive reasoning part of the architectural design thinking 
process are simulation and calculation environments. As sug-
gested, the application logic of such environments is typically 
written beforehand and can be considered relatively static. A 
calculation result is obtained based on this application logic and 
some user input (e.g., a CAD model). The main difficulty is creat-
ing this network of premises—input model and application logic—
from which the deductive reasoning starts. Creating such a 
network suffers from the same issue already described: Too many 
essential parameters are lost in translating ill-structured real-
world knowledge into a well-defined information structure.
 Applications that might be understood as surrogates for 
the inductive reasoning part of architectural design thinking— 
as described in Peirce’s theory—are modeling applications. Such 
applications enable the production of visual design tryouts in 
far more diverse ways than is traditionally the case. Although 
designers were previously “limited” to paper-based sketching or 
to building physical models, they can now rely on a myriad of 
modeling and visualization applications to conduct experiments or 
create design tryouts. This process replaces the inductive reason-
ing mode in the sense that original hypotheses can be tested and 
then confirmed or refuted. However, it does not replace the induc-
tive reasoning part in the sense that a knowledge base behind the 
application is adjusted according to the result of the test.
Tools for Experimenting
An alternate possibility is to consider each of the outlined infor- 
mation systems or applications as nothing more than parts of 
the physical world with which designers interact. In this approach, 
applications are similar to other elements in the physical 
world, and interaction with the applications occurs similarly to 
the way that Purcell and Gero articulate interaction with sketches, 
diagrams, and drawings.49 When reconsidering the schema dis-
cussed earlier, such applications thus lie in the lower left corner 
(see Figure 5). In this part of the overall reasoning process, they 
provide extra environments for producing inductive experiments.
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 In this application development approach, the reasoning 
cycle outlined by Peirce takes place entirely in the human mind, 
and the application is just a tool in which to conduct experiments. 
The assumption is that designers produce the hypothesis and 
prediction autonomously using their own “designerly knowledge” 
and abductive and deductive reasoning. The prediction generates 
an expectation that can be tested in an experiment or design 
tryout. Modeling environments are perfect examples of how 
applications can act as tools for experimenting. However, the expe-
rience-based retrieval systems and the calculation and simulation 
applications also can be considered tools for experimenting. In a 
system like MACE, for instance, designers already have the kind of 
results in mind that they expect to see when searching or brows-
ing. The result produced by the system confirms or refutes this 
expectation. Similarly, when preparing a model in an application 
to calculate, for instance, the energy performance level, designers 
already have in mind what kind of energy performance level they 
expect the system to produce. This implicitly known result is con-
stituted by the abductive reasoning step taking place in the human 
mind. Again, the result produced by the application confirms or 
refutes this expectation. Note that the inductive learning also takes 
place in the human mind in this case.
 When developing and using applications in accordance with 
this approach, one should bear in mind that the information struc-
ture in the application has only limited use. The actual reasoning 
takes place in the human mind, which is perfectly fit to handle ill-
structured problems and is thus far more powerful than any of the 
possible information structures of the application. The merit of 
producing applications using this approach is that the number of 
tools for experimenting in the physical world notably increases.
Figure 5
Information Systems as Extra Environments 
for Producing Inductive Experiments or  
Design Tryouts.
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Autonomous Reasoning Agents
A third and last application development approach we consider 
is that of autonomous reasoning agents. In such an approach, all 
three reasoning modes outlined by Peirce are implemented and 
combined in a dynamic information system. In this setting, the 
information structure is completely dynamic: it evolves step by 
step through every single observation or experiment made by 
the reasoning agent. Combining the diverse reasoning modes in a 
continuous cyclical process—instead of focusing on each of these 
reasoning modes separately—theoretically allows for the develop-
ment of an information system that can make hypotheses, make 
predictions, devise experiments, and learn—all based on the obser-
vations and experiments the system continuously goes through.
 Research on such systems is ongoing, but early results are 
emerging. One of the most notable results is the “robot scientist” 
system, which was developed for doing scientific research semi-
autonomously in a particular sub-field of yeast micro-biology.50 
This system implements a reasoning process similar, but not 
identical, to the process outlined in Figure 4 or to Peirce’s process. 
The result is a robot that can start from an experimental observa-
tion; interpret what it sees based on the background information 
that was, in this case, formalized in ontologies and inserted in 
the robot; make hypotheses that explain the observation at 
hand; devise experiments to test these hypotheses; do these exper-
iments; and learn from these experiments. This process goes on in 
continuous cycles. Because Peirce’s process of inquiry is suppos-
edly also at play in other application domains, a similar approach 
could theoretically be developed for design thinking support. 
For instance, semantic web technologies theoretically enable 
software developers to build information systems dynamically 
from the output of reasoning engines.51 This could eventually 
result in autonomous reasoning agents. Other approaches might be 
equally feasible if they combine the three reasoning modes into 
one system, following the outline of Peirce. This combination is 
necessary because, as we have seen, working with separate surro-
gates for reasoning modes brings insufficient added value.
 This kind of support would be completely different from 
any traditional kind of support currently provided by information 
systems. Similarly to the way in which it happens in the robot 
scientist project, the reasoning system would evolve into an inde-
pendent agent reasoning about a design situation, and it would 
thus not directly interfere with reasoning processes of the human 
designer. The main support it could give to a human would pre-
sumably be similar to the support any designer gives to any other 
designer—namely, by simple dialogue and discussion of design 
alternatives, from which both generate their own interpretations 
and start their own reasoning processes. A similar agent-based 
role for information systems was suggested by Lawson.52
50 See Ross D. King et al., “The Automation 
of Science,” Science 324, no. 85 (2009): 
85-89; and Oliver Ray, “Automated 
Abduction in Scientific Discovery,” in 
Model-Based Reasoning in Science  
and Medicine, ed. Lorenzo Magnani and 
Ping Li (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2007), 
103-16; Oliver Ray et al., “Towards the 
Automation of Scientific Method,” in 
Proceedings of the 21st International 
Joint Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence: Workshop on Abductive  
and Inductive Knowledge Development 
(Pasadena: IJCAI and AAAI Press,  
2009), 27-33.
51 See Tim Berners-Lee, James Hendler,  
and Ora Lassila, “The Semantic Web,” 
Scientific American 284, no. 5 (2001): 
34-43; and Chris Bizer, Tom Heath,  
and Tim Berners-Lee, “Linked Data:  
The Story So Far,” International Journal 
on Semantic Web and Information 
Systems 5, no. 3 (2009): 1-22.
52 Bryan Lawson, “Oracles, Draughtsmen, 
and Agents: The Nature of Knowledge 
and Creativity in Design and the Role  
of IT,” Automation in Construction 14,  
no. 3 (2005): 383-91.
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 We go through a simple example, starting from a design 
brief, to show how such a reasoning agent might work in an archi-
tectural design environment. The design brief is given to the rea-
soning agent. Similar to the human process, the reasoning agent 
goes through the brief line by line, word by word, at each step 
interpreting the contents of the brief using its own personal back-
ground knowledge. In every step, the reasoning agent actually 
goes through the entire reasoning cycle, thereby making hypothe-
ses about the meaning of words in the brief (interpretation), predict-
ing what it will read next, and testing its prediction (projection) 
by actually reading through the next word. At every step in this 
reading process, a—hypothetical and fallible—understanding of 
both “problem” and “solution” is constructed (cfr. co-evolution). 
After reading through the design brief, the reasoning agent pro-
ceeds in the way it assumes is best. This decision is again made 
using one or more reasoning cycles. For instance, the agent might 
hypothesize that the best way to proceed is to construct a 3D 
model of a part of the problem. Starting from this hypothesis, a 
whole set of additional reasoning cycles starts, enabling the rea-
soning agent to continuously undertake an action, reflect on the 
action, and make new hypotheses based on the action. Through 
these reasoning cycles toward a complete 3D model, the agent not 
only reflects on and learns about 3D modeling; it also adjusts its 
initial understanding of the design problem and solution into a 
new and more refined understanding. And the cycles continue.
 Such a situation is far from being realized, and whether 
it can ever be realized is unknown. In the robot scientist pro- 
ject, a significant amount of information was formalized and 
inserted as a background information model for the robot. With 
this formalized knowledge in place, 6.6 million optical density 
measurements were made, eventually resulting in a formalized 
scientific argumentation structure that includes more than 10,000 
different research units in a hierarchical structure of 10 levels. 
These research units are representations of segments of experi-
mental research, including studies, cycles, trials, tests, and 
replicates. Note, however, that the system ultimately addresses 
only a very small subdomain in functional genomics.53 Building a 
similar model for all “designerly” information is practically infea-
sible, especially when taking into account Lawson’s remark that 
designerly knowledge also includes motivations, beliefs, values, 
and attitudes. For such an approach to work, the information 
model used by the reasoning agent will thus have to be built up by 
the agent. Although this model is theoretically possible using a 
combination of abductive, deductive, and inductive reasoning, a 
more challenging objective would be difficult to imagine.
 A crucial issue in building such a system is that the theory 
requires the reasoning agent to be actively embedded in a physical 
world if it wants to learn anything of realistic “size.” In the case of 53 King et al., “The Automation of Science,” 85-89.
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architectural design, the reasoning agent would have to actually 
go through realistic architectural design processes by itself. That 
anyone would ever actually allow the agent to do so is highly 
unlikely. But even before such a scenario could come within reach, 
the reasoning agent would have to be able to communicate reliably 
with the surrounding physical world according to the theory. In 
fact, such an agent would need to be able to sense (i.e., in auditory, 
olfactory, gustatory, visual, and tactile ways) and act similarly to 
the way humans do to construct useful knowledge autonomously 
and produce useful input to anyone. Such a development would be 
problematic even for the most basic sensory communication 
because little is known about how this process of sensing, con-
structing knowledge and acting accordingly occurs in the human 
body. Consequently, this third approach appears highly unlikely 
to be implemented anytime soon.
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
We have presented in this article a critical evaluation of informa-
tion system support for architectural design thinking. This evalua-
tion was closely tied to a significant number of theories, both in 
design thinking and philosophy. We chose to use Peirce’s process 
of (scientific) inquiry as a helpful explanatory framework for sev-
eral of the phenomena identified in architectural design thinking. 
This process of inquiry continuously proceeds by iteration through 
a cycle of abductive, deductive, and inductive reasoning, with a 
dynamic background knowledge and parts of the physical world 
as its premises.
 As a result, we distinguish three main development 
approaches in information system support for architectural 
designers. In the first approach, applications are designed and 
implemented as surrogates for each of the reasoning modes 
included in Peirce’s process of inquiry. Such an approach appears 
to be of less value because it requires both application developers 
and users to endlessly convert real-world problem situations, 
which are essentially ill-structured, into artificial, well-defined 
problem situations. This process is tedious and time-consuming, 
and compared to our own reasoning capabilities, its results are 
not as reliable and useful as they should be. In the second 
approach, all information systems providing support to a designer 
are considered additional parts of the physical world. Similar to a 
paper and a pencil, a CAD system or a simulation environment 
allows a designer to make inductive experiments or design tryouts. 
The main disadvantage of this approach is that resulting support 
systems are of limited use because the actual reasoning process 
remains completely out of the application environment. The main 
value of this approach is that an important number of additional, 
previously unavailable “test environments” can be provided to 
designers. This second approach is the one generally used these 
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days, although it might not always be recognized as such. The 
third and last approach is to build reasoning agents that autono-
mously go through the reasoning cycle outlined by Peirce. This 
radically different approach, to our knowledge, has never been 
implemented in its complete form. In this case, all three reasoning 
modes are combined in a dynamic information system, changing 
continuously in response to the experiences of the reasoning agent. 
With this combination, such an agent theoretically should be able 
to make hypotheses, make predictions, devise experiments, and 
learn —all based on the observations and experiments which the 
system continuously goes through. The main barrier towards this 
approach, assuming that it is even feasible, is that the reasoning 
agent needs to be actively embedded in a physical world and needs 
to be able to communicate reliably with this world. Without such 
embeddedness and communication, it would never be capable of 
building up an adequate knowledge base, nor of communicating 
this knowledge to designers.
 Of the three approaches, the second is the most—perhaps 
the only—feasible strategy toward information system support. 
What both designers and software developers have to bear in 
mind, however, is the limited effect of this approach on archi- 
tectural design thinking. This approach contradicts many new 
and innovative proposals in information system support for 
design thinking that claim to provide all kinds of automation 
features and generative mechanisms. As we indicated in this 
article, such systems remain to be used mainly as useful envi- 
ronments for design tryouts.
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